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Citing ‘whatever’ authority: The ethics of quotation in the work of Giorgio Agamben 
 
Colby Dickinson 
Loyola University Chicago 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to lay out an analysis of Giorgio Agamben’s central claims with regard to the formation 
of a theory of citationality.  By juxtaposing Walter Benjamin’s theory of citations alongside his more 
recent, critical engagements with the western theological tradition, Agamben sets himself the goal of 
redefining ethics along Levinasian lines in order to arrive at a respect for the face of ‘whatever’ being 
before us, the true source toward which all citations point.     
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Introduction 
 
Put simply, no matter how they are performed, citations are references made to an original source 
(their origin), made in order to bolster an argument or claim to legitimacy.  For this reason, citations are 
also inherently contentious, whether presented as such or not.  For example, there may be a discrepancy 
between the citation and the source, or a source may be used incorrectly—taken ‘out of context’—or the 
use of a source might simply appear as ‘dated’ or uncritically appropriated, having been discredited since 
the advent of its publication.  Perhaps the biggest offender among these might be the use of a citation with 
no immediate relevance to the context of a present argument, one which was simply used to convey a 
sense of authority to the claims being made, as if simply the mention of a particularly revered source were 
enough to dispel any attempts to make a claim to the contrary.   
In recent memory, the investigation of the usage of citations—their role and function in society in 
general—has given rise to further deepened theories of ‘citationality’ that seek to explore everything from 
the performability and reproducibility of the ‘signature’ (Derrida) to the manner in which even gender 
could be said to cite previous social performances of its kind (Butler 1993).  The import of these claims, if 
considered on the whole, is that citations are explicit acts of social, cultural, political and even religious 
representation.  They are seldom posited neutrally—their careful selection often speaks volumes enough 
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already—and they are often the difference between safeguarding a common practical sense of 
intelligibility (for most) and providing a much sought after emancipation (for some).  A quick scan of 
one’s frequently used sources is often enough therefore to loosely identify one’s particular ideological 
leanings.  Yet, as any ‘reputable’ or ‘respectable’ academic society will testify, it is the use of these 
citations, and the traditions they inspire, which grants a certain intelligibility to our discourses.  Without 
them, we would otherwise seemingly run the risk of being incomprehensible, or—perhaps worse—of 
simply not being taken seriously.  Negotiating the middle ground between these two positions, as I will 
argue in what follows, is the difficult territory within an educational setting that must become more 
transparent. 
Beginning with a theory of citations in the work of the late-modern German literary critic Walter 
Benjamin, before turning to its subsequent elaboration and acquired ethical dimensions in the work of 
Giorgio Agamben, I seek here to demonstrate something essential to the nature of citations and the role(s) 
they play in culture today, both within and beyond their literary and academic contexts.  This is in many 
ways a task of exposing the tactics of a practice so common to academic contexts that it often goes 
unnoticed: claims of authority and legitimation in general are posited and contested through the citations 
we invoke, whether we recognize this fact or not.  In so many words, a more fully developed theory of 
citationality, as I am here attempting to sketch, might enable us to better grasp not only the undisclosed 
role of citations in academic contexts today, but also the aporia (and hence impossibility) of an authority’s 
supposed legitimation, its ‘ungroundedness’ as it were.  The inability to ever fully ground one’s authority 
over time, that is, to reign ‘legitimately’ as sovereign in any sense (and this is the political question that 
Agamben has pursued in a variety of contexts), is illustrated by the often ambiguous and ultimately 
unjustifiable usage of citations.   
Following from this, Agamben’s depiction of citationality can be seen as a heavy contestation of 
the western cultural tradition, a creative re-reading ‘against the grain’ which attempts to undo the 
obfuscations of our most normative claims and their accompanying frequent citations.  By conducting my 
inquiry thus, I intend to show how, over and beyond the theological—Agamben’s most recent and choice 
discipline in this respect—the ultimate source sought by all citations, again whether social, cultural, 
political or religious, according to Agamben, is the singular nature of the face before us, the ‘whatever’ 
face that calls us to a relationship bound by love.  Within this rather Levinasian sounding proposition, 
Agamben works quickly toward an examination of the ethical dimensions of citations.  By opening our 
thought to an ethics ‘beyond representation’, then, Agamben seeks to challenge our standardized 
conceptualizations of ethics, in order to offer us a completely new manner by which to view the use of 
citations today. 
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Cultural transmission as the art of myth 
 
I begin with Walter Benjamin, whose work has been heavily influential upon the English-
speaking world in the last few decades (see, among others, Caygill; Weber).  Beyond the seemingly 
strange and unusual topics he often chose as his subject matter (e.g. children’s toys and books, 
photography, shopping arcades, major European urban landscapes, etc.), Benjamin was in no small 
measure fascinated with the art of collecting.  It was something that he often directly wrote about, from 
the associations made while unpacking his own library (Benjamin 1999a, 2:pp. 486-93) to his more 
studied reflections upon the Marxist art historian Eduard Fuchs, ‘Collector and Historian’ (Benjamin 
2002, 3:pp. 260-85).  Collections were, for Benjamin, more than bourgeois indulgences; they were an 
open door to the past that likewise contained the potential to reassign values within a contemporary 
context.  They were for him the most ‘profane’ manifestations of a ‘nearness’ to the past, something that 
could almost conjure a sacred air with their very presence.  They were, in fact, that which binds us to the 
past better than anything else in our modern world could (Benjamin 1999b, pp. 205).   
In the face of traditions which were, and still are, dissolving, the collector becomes the individual 
who exhibits this reality of relations best through a transfiguration of objects removed from their original, 
historical context.  This is an act which Agamben, who is also Benjamin’s Italian translator and editor, 
will describe as, ‘suddenly depriving them both of their use value and of the ethical-social significance 
with which tradition had endowed them’ (Agamben 1999, p. 105).  Henceforth, collections seemingly 
float through existence, removed from any worldly economy and severed from any meaningful use within 
a particular, traditional society.  Hence the quasi-mystical character they exude simply by existing, a 
quality many a modern museum patron might also attest to.  It should further be stated that Agamben’s 
relevance here is no minor matter for further developing Benjamin’s theory of collecting.   
Over the past several years, Agamben’s popularity among scholars working within a wide array 
of fields has itself grown quite quickly (see, among others, Durantaye; Mills; Zartaloudis).  And, I would 
note, it is in his (re)articulations of Benjamin’s theory of cultural transmission that we are privy to the 
political dimensions present in any ‘renewal’ of a given tradition and its accompanying authority.  This is 
indeed a profound connection that can be gathered under the mark of ‘citationality’, as we shall soon see.   
At this point, however, and within the context of collecting, Agamben considers the course of 
Benjamin’s analysis as illustrating a ‘revolutionary’ disjuncture in history (cf. Fritsch).  As he puts it, the 
collector is something of a ‘revolutionary’ figure, since, for both, ‘[…] the new can appear only through 
the destruction of the old.  And it is certainly not an accident that the great collector figures flourish 
precisely in times of break from tradition and exaltation of renewal […] (Agamben 1999, p. 105). This 
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development is in sharp contrast, we are told, to a ‘traditional society’ wherein ‘[…] neither the quotation 
nor the collection is conceivable, since it is not possible to break at any point the links of the chain of 
tradition by which the transmission of the past takes place’ (Agamben 1999, p. 105).  Like the nostalgia 
for former national contexts which have since collapsed and which subsequently drive interest in 
collecting goods and memorabilia from such periods (as, for example, with the ‘Ostalgie’ some people 
display for the former East Germany), a fondness for these historical items can only derive its worth from 
a radical rupture within our representations of history and its traditional contextual moorings (i.e. 
national, ideological, etc).   
As Agamben will further assert, the phenomenon of collecting in the modern era is inseparable 
from our cultural perceptions of art.  Indeed, understanding the relation of the two, collecting and art, can 
aid our comprehension of the ethos in which we are situated.  Our present age, Agamben considers, is one 
wherein the art collections housed in public museums quickly find their mirror image in private houses 
that are turned into quasi-museums.  This lack of a genuine of the art within one’s daily life experience is 
symbolized by the place of the museum in society today, or, as he puts it, ‘The impossibility of using has 
its emblematic place in the Museum’ (Agamben 2007. p. 84).  This trend for him represents not only a 
seismic shift in the cultural relevance of art, but also the impossibility of an authentic experience being 
present through art, not to mention the impossibility of an actual use being attached to many objects 
within someone’s own home.  It registers an ‘impossibility of use’ that one faces when confronted with 
the reality of ‘things’ themselves.  As such, our world is immersed within a state of constantly expanding 
collections, something he terms ‘the museification of our world’.  This is the reality in which ‘One by 
one, the spiritual potentialities that defined people’s lives—art, religion, philosophy, the idea of nature, 
even politics—have docilely withdrawn into the Museum’ (Agamben 2007, p. 84).  And it is this 
‘enclosure’ of the space of the ‘museum’ which has almost paradoxically expanded to encompass most of 
our living space.  ‘In this sense, the Museum can coincide with an entire city […] a region […] and even a 
group of individuals […] But more generally, everything today can become a Museum, because this term 
simply designates the exhibition of an impossibility of using, of dwelling, of experiencing’ (Agamben 
2007, p. 84).  As a quasi-sacred zone, the boundaries of the museum come to proclaim the definitive 
eradication of (daily, practical) use of the objects that are part and parcel of humanity itself.  These 
objects, having been ‘museified’, are now rendered useless to humanity, captured within the domain of an 
aesthetic which cannot bring them (mythically) back to ‘life’ (as something ‘useable’).  How an ethical 
(or religious) experience, or any experience at all for that matter, is possible within the modern era thus 
remains tentative at best. 
 Instead, as he will elaborate in another context, art now only maintains its ability to identify itself 
with the destruction of tradition, with the intransmissibility that is at the origin of ‘the experience of 
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shock’ (Agamben 1999, p. 106).  This is a process which, in the last half of the previous century, had 
quickly taken to accelerating the forces of disruption, producing a ‘shock’ value intended to invoke a 
radical disruption with history itself.  As each new stage of art seemingly renders the mediums and 
modalities of previous eras insufficient, outdated, and surpassed, we are inundated by the relics or items 
now intended only for collections, not for actual use.  Art itself becomes only that which is to be 
collected, with its past, symbolic role consequently being further lessened over time.  In effect, the ‘latest’ 
and ‘most contemporary’ art, pushed to its most extreme form, will in fact only serve the purpose of 
preventing traditional forms of cultural transmission and translatability from taking place.   
Politics becomes, in this context, re-defined as the space where meaningful symbolic utterance is 
continuously narrowed by these (artistic) processes, because it is precisely these processes that define the 
public sphere of intelligibility.  As he puts it, ‘The reproduction of the dissolution of transmissibility in 
the experience of shock becomes, then, the last possible source of meaning and value for things 
themselves, and art becomes the last tie connecting man to his past’ (Agamben 1999, p. 107).  In turn, this 
permanently present existence of art isolates traditional forms of both meaning and value, threatening to 
render many peoples and cultures as symbolically obsolete.  The present subject of cultural transmission 
becomes as such ever more alienated, indeed even solipsistic.  In this sense, ‘The survival of the past in 
the imponderable instant of aesthetic epiphany is, in the final analysis, the alienation effected by the work 
of art, and this alienation is in its turn nothing other than the measure of the destruction of its 
transmissibility, that is, of tradition’ (Agamben 1999, p. 107).  
 With this advent of the unprecedented destruction of tradition, what becomes clear is that—while 
this is no longer the case—culture once was inseparable from its transmission.  While ‘pre-modern’, it 
was united as a single entity within a given context, defining traditional societies as communities with no 
gap between their past and their present, that is, between their culture and its transmission.  The recording 
of history had not yet acquired its modern focus upon the dichotomy of continuity and rupture.  From this 
pre-modern perspective, values, whether ethical, religious or aesthetic, had no meaning outside of this 
indissoluble bond between the act of transmission and the thing being transmitted.  In many ways, 
modern attempts to formulate an ethics based on communitarian values are still founded on the possibility 
of this connection, a linkage which Agamben wholeheartedly denies as a genuine possibility for our age.  
In contradistinction to this state of ‘traditional’ affairs, the ‘interruption of tradition […] opens an era in 
which no link is possible between old and new, if not the infinite accumulation of the old in a sort of 
monstrous archive or the alienation effected by the very means that is supposed to help with the 
transmission of the old’ (Agamben 1999, p. 108).  This state gives rise, then, to an ‘accumulated culture’, 
as he puts it, that yet presses forward through time without meaning, and which seemingly functions only 
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to reveal our suspension in a groundless void of existence.  It is an accumulation that gathers itself under 
the sign of ‘the collection’, the debris lying in piles among us. 
 The deep resonance of this theme with the ‘angel of history’ as depicted by Benjamin is 
purposefully re-asserted by Agamben in this context.  For Benjamin, the angel, as the illustrative figure of 
his final great work ‘On the Concept of History’, becomes symbolic of the melancholic engagement with 
the past, with its thrust toward the future and with the impossibility of transmitting the past to the present, 
or that which seemingly most needs to be retained from all of history.  As Benjamin describes the angel, 
His face is turned toward the past.  Where a chain of events appears before us, he sees one single 
catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet.  The angel 
would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed.  But a storm is 
blowing from Paradise and has got caught in his wings; it is so strong that the angel can no longer 
close them.  This storm drives him irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, while 
the pile of debris before him grows toward the sky.  What we call progress is this storm.  
(Benjamin 2003, p. 392) 
 
For Agamben, this image captures the ragged edge of the situation humanity now faces: our complete 
encasement within the aesthetic (i.e. the modern ‘museification’ of the world), and the impossibility of 
our truly ever reaching the domain of the mythical-theological, despite our desire to ascend to it.  As he 
comments on this state of affairs, ‘The past that the angel of history is no longer able to comprehend 
reconstitutes its form in front of the angel or art; but this form is the alienated image in which the past 
finds its truth again only on condition of negating it, and knowledge of the new is possible only in the 
nontruth of the old’ (Agamben 1999, p. 110).  Again, the rupture is affirmed as the very way in which art 
re-constitutes itself in the present.   
 The best that humanity can now achieve is a sort of ‘suspended’ living, one that neither touches 
the core of our reality as human-being nor fabricates a solution to the deadlock between the past and the 
present.  Everything in fact seems bound for a course of destruction and the accompanying debris which 
seems to dissolve any chance for redemption.  This is a problem as theological as it is historical, though 
the difference between them is not always clear, and its implications stretch even further than this, as I 
will suggest.  The only reality to be grasped in this world, and by this score, is one of an inherent 
alienation of the subject who struggles to comprehend and grasp the symbols at hand, that is, to 
(aesthetically) give order to them in some sense, all the while ultimately failing to achieve the traditional 
(mythological-theological) meaning once ascribed to life (that which had once guaranteed its meaning) 
(cf. Benjamin 199b, ‘Convolute N’).  Hence, Agamben’s commentary on Benjamin’s most fundamental 
historical image: 
The redemption that the angel of art offers to the past, summoning it to appear outside its real 
context on the day of aesthetic Last Judgment, is, then, nothing other than its death (or rather, its 
inability to die) in the museum of aesthetics.  And the angel’s melancholy is the consciousness 
7 
 
that he has adopted alienation as his world; it is the nostalgia of a reality that he can possess only 
by making it unreal.  (Agamben 1999, p. 110)   
 
The integrity of experience once present to us in its fullness, as undivided and in some sense ‘pure’, is 
now forever separated from itself, causing each possession (as part of a collection) to remain in an 
ethereal state only, again suspended from actual use.  Each concrete reality exists consequently as 
ultimately inexperienceable.  Mirroring his comments elsewhere on the poetic (Agamben 1991, p. 74ff; 
1993a, p. 15ff; 1993b, p. xvii), Agamben here depicts the contemporary aesthetic project as one that is 
fundamentally intertwined with the plight of the modern autonomous subject in that this subject must, in a 
sense, utilize art in order to inhabit its world, even if it is an ‘unreal’ world in many respects. 
 As such, aesthetics comes to replace tradition in the contemporary world, uniting the past we 
cannot fully grasp with the present wherein we are continuously having to re-create ourselves.  By doing 
so, however, and as an astute observer might suspect, contemporary aesthetics actually begins to praise its 
discontinuity with the past, offering this rupture itself as valuable to the processes of forming a modern 
subjectivity.  As Agamben frames it, ‘By destroying the transmissibility of the past, aesthetics recuperates 
it negatively and makes intransmissibility a value in itself in the image of aesthetic beauty, in this way 
opening for man a space between past and future in which he can found his action and his knowledge’ 
(Agamben 1999, p. 110).  In which, he will later state directly, humanity can reign sovereign (Agamben 
2004).  Under these conditions, the survival of culture is itself lodged within the modern alienation of art, 
and its intransmissability is a sign of its perpetual need for re-creation, something perhaps not unfamiliar 
to an advanced capitalist economy or a pop art/advertising mentality.  It is also in many ways the prime 
exemplar of the human condition, the state of humanity in which we must ceaselessly articulate ourselves 
in order to posit itself as ‘real’ (human beings) over and against the animality of our nature (cf. Agamben 
2004). 
 Aesthetics today thus performs a two-fold act of extreme significance which we can now note: it 
eradicates the distance between the object of history and its transmission into the present, and, as it 
accomplishes this act, it inches closer toward the boundary of what was once the mythical-traditional.  
This occurs yet with one important distinction still remaining between the ‘traditional society’ and our 
own: art ‘[…] although it can reach the threshold of myth, it cannot cross it’ (Agamben 1999, p. 114).  In 
this frustration, and by refusing to force a conceptual bridge to be constructed between them, humanity is 
capable of comprehending, perhaps for the first time, the true nature of its (art-ificial) situatedness in the 
world: 
If man could appropriate his historical condition, and if, seeing through the illusion of the storm 
that perennially pushes him along the infinite rail of linear time, he could exit his paradoxical 
situation, he would at the same time gain access to the total knowledge capable of giving life a 
new cosmogony and to turn history into myth.  But art alone cannot do this, since it is precisely in 
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order to reconcile the historical conflict between past and future that it has emancipated itself 
from myth and linked itself to history.  (Agamben 1999, p. 114) 
 
It is this modern ‘aesthetic’ deadlock which allows humanity to grasp its dwelling within the world most 
acutely.  In this fashion, art touches the border of what was traditionally the domain of the mythic-
religious.  Despite this proximity, however, it cannot cross over into ‘becoming myth’ as it were.  Art 
stands alone as it were and religion in its traditional forms is determined to be hollow.  The symbols 
which once most sustained the continuity between traditions and their people (the ‘political theologies’ 
that gave rise to elaborate and rich religious landscapes) are now suspended amidst a quest for (aesthetic) 
meaning that is prevented from continuing itself.  Art, in the end, enacts nothing more profound than the 
revelation of our sense of alienation in the world.   
Echoing one of Agamben’s basic re-iterations in this context, and as he here reads Kafka very 
closely, we might be able to see how redemption for the modern subject, waits on the other side, though, 
as Kafka said, it is ‘not for us’ (Agamben 2005a, pp. 56-7).  Beyond this, however, it is more than just our 
understanding of religion or myth that is deeply altered by such insights, for from the traditional space 
occupied by the theological flows our very relationship to language itself, to all writing then, and certainly 
(perhaps above all else) to those tirelessly working to lend some sense of authority or meaning to their 
work through the citations they invoke (see Agamben 2010a). 
 
 
Citing the Messiah 
 
 This refusal to endorse redemption as a concept ‘for us’ moderns is something which Agamben 
takes significantly to heart.  It is a situation for him that is embraceable through the fact that Kafka’s 
genius, as Benjamin had previously noted, is that he was able to sacrifice ‘truth for the sake of 
transmissibility’ (Agamben 1999, p. 114; cf. Benjamin 1973, p. 763).  This fact is what prods Agamben to 
cite Kafka as the writer who ‘most coherently’ displays this interruption of the linear time of history.  It is 
an interruption that art tries to re-appropriate and bridge this gap by juxtaposing alongside it ‘the 
paradoxical image of a state of history in which the fundamental event of the human condition is 
perpetually taking place; the continuum of linear time is interrupted, but does not create an opening 
beyond itself’ (Agamben 1999, p. 113).  It is also a purely immanent consideration of how humanity 
constantly engages with its own identity, framed by the intransmissability of the past and so also 
perpetually in need of re-establishing itself.  This is a condition, we might add, that is never fully resolved 
because humanity is not able to properly unify its past with its present.   
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 For Benjamin, who developed a form of ‘dialectical materialism’ precisely to address such a split 
in humanity’s ‘origins’, the figure of the messiah (whether conceivable as an historical person, or as an 
image from the past) was crucial to fulfilling history and recuperating, in some sense at least, our 
humanity.  A messiah was the only figure who could bridge the gap between art and myth, restoring 
humanity’s fundamental symbols to their proper use.  It is the messiah as messenger who ‘reveals’ the 
linguistic fact of our being to us, as the use of the concept logos to identify the messiah in Christianity 
will make more than clear.  This is the message that concerns the nature of the medium itself, and thus, 
for Agamben, announces the significance of language in establishing ‘humanity’ as such.1  Stating the 
existence of language therefore is the fundamental human trajectory that all of our human endeavors point 
toward, with religion maintaining simply a privileged position, according to Agamben, in this regard 
(Agamben 2000a, ‘The Idea of Language’).  This ‘revelation’ will even induce him to construct an image 
of a messenger similar to Benjamin’s, a messenger who is the long-awaited messianic figure who brings 
this knowledge down to us, and would have it circulate among us. 
 This ‘messenger’, moreover, is the figure of the messiah, a religious historical figure whom 
Agamben depicts as involved in ‘revealing’ the origin of language as nothing more than the task of 
transmission itself.  With this characterization, he is able to portray the messianic figure historically as 
one who restores humanity to its own ‘infancy’, a place of openness and pure potentiality, the only true 
act of redemption possible for a humanity otherwise bent on securing its own actuality (as a bid for 
sovereignty) (cf. Agamben 1993a).  It is only this messianic movement—which is an apparent regression, 
if you will—that finally engages in acts of profanation in order to allow humanity to appropriate an 
historical space for itself, to remove things from their ‘museified’ (quasi-sacred) state and return them to 
their intended use.  His radical rereading of Saint Paul, in the midst of a continuous contemporary revival 
of philosophical views on Pauline literature, also reveals as much (see Agamben 2005a).  In a nutshell, 
these are the threads which unite all of Agamben’s varied works.  Indeed, this is a linkage between 
threads that is only further certified for Agamben by the indissociable, though undisclosed, bond between 
Benjamin and Saint Paul, a forceful structural connection made in order to depict the ‘weak force’ of 
messianic power working within history.  As Agamben puts it himself, ‘[…] this orientation toward the 
past characteristic of Benjamin’s messianism finds its canonic moment in Paul’ (Agamben 2005a, p. 144).  
This is, of course, certainly not a claim which all Benjamin scholars must find convincing, but it is one 
that lies central to Agamben’s securing of his own philosophical integrity. 
                                                 
1
 ‘Since the goal is already present and thus no path exists that could lead there, only the perennially late 
stubbornness of a messenger whose message is nothing other than the task of transmission can give back to man, 
who has lost his ability to appropriate his historical space, the concrete space of his action and knowledge’ 
(Agamben 1999, p. 114).   
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 It is a difficult connection to prove conclusively, especially since it potentially involves the 
controversial use of what Benjamin referred to as a ‘citation without citation’, something which sounds 
dangerously close to plagiarism in its most literal form.  It is also, however, that which Agamben detects 
at work in Benjamin’s conceptualization of history as an indebtedness to Pauline thought that Benjamin 
himself had to efface in order to remain loyal to the logic of citationality, as I will now try to explain.  
According to Agamben, this was a logic which bound Benjamin to approach the truth of Paul’s 
propositions, as it were, without relying upon the authority of the source, an attempt perhaps to subvert 
the traditional (over)reliance upon citations as legitimations of one’s position and certainly an attempt to 
avoid ‘being sovereign’ in some sense.  The stress of the contemporary ‘fracture of being’, its radicality, 
and its crisis today, however, is what presses Agamben to work toward an ‘unveiling’ of sources in this 
regard.  As he puts it, ‘Whatever the case may be, there is no reason to doubt that these two fundamental 
messianic texts of our tradition, separated by almost two thousand years, both written in a situation of 
radical crisis, form a constellation whose time of legibility has finally come today […]’ (Agamben 2005a, 
p. 145).  This is a constellation upon which Agamben, for his part, will heavily rely. 
By aligning Benjamin’s theory of citationality within a Pauline framework with his own earlier 
work on art and history (which we have just seen), Agamben is able to work toward a definition of the 
citation that parallels his comments on art as the ‘secret meeting place’ between the past and the present.  
Accordingly, pulling citations (as messianic images) from the past in order to destroy (otherwise violent 
and imposing) representations within the present: this, and only this, is the way toward undermining the 
traditional notions of authority that have dominated our world under the banner of ‘sovereignty’ for 
centuries, something which we are today perhaps only just now beginning to discern in some sense 
(Agamben 2005a, p. 139).2  This leads Agamben to rearticulate Benjamin’s essential point: ‘When it is 
truly redeemed and truly saved, humanity is therefore in possession of its past.  But for humanity to be in 
possession of it, Benjamin says, is for it to be able to cite it’ (Agamben 2000a, pp 151-2).  The citation, as 
such, appears consequently as the key to restoring the modern alienated subject, though we still need to 
flush out the details of what such an illumination may involve. 
This desire for citations as a reworking of the past is what, undoubtedly, lies center-stage within 
Benjamin’s grandiose Arcades Project, a piecemeal of associations and quotations never formally 
finalized but which contained the fragments of his entire corpus.  In it were the citations and assorted 
reflections which characterized the culmination of his thoughts on a materialist historiography as it was 
concerned with the collision of tradition and catastrophe, with a ‘tradition that is catastrophe’ (Benjamin 
                                                 
2
 Likewise, this seems to be the source of Agamben’s involvement with German legal theorist Carl Schmitt and his 
Homo Sacer project, for the link between citation and authority is one which reveals the powers at work in our world 
as much as the means toward subverting them (cf. Agamben 1998; Agamben 2005b). 
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1999b, p. 473).  As Agamben, for his part, unpacks Benjamin’s ‘theory of citation’, he begins to negotiate 
the journey between the poles of destruction and creation, catastrophe and tradition, until the line between 
them begins to blur.  Citation destroys, to be sure, as it rips words from their originary context: ‘To write 
history thus means to cite history.  It belongs to the concept of citation, however, that the historical object 
in each case is torn from its context’ (Benjamin 1999b, p. 476)—but it is also, at the same time, an act of 
transfiguration worked in coordination perhaps with the power of justice, as his celebrated theses on the 
concept of history make abundantly clear.  These ‘destructive forces’ of liberation are housed in the act of 
citation itself, setting Benjamin’s project at a great distance from any historicist effort to ‘eternalize’ the 
past or fix the narrative of ‘History’ once and for all.  In Benjamin’s depiction, rather, any redemption of 
the past is necessarily the way in which to fulfill it, and therefore closer to the means of discarding certain 
readings of it.  It is a ‘return to origins’ that liberates them from their place within a given canonical 
representation of history without necessarily involving an historical, locatable origin as such.  Hence, as 
Agamben will describe it, ‘The return to the origin that is at issue here thus in no way signifies the 
reconstruction of something as it once was, the reintegration of something into an origin understood as a 
real and eternal figure of its truth’ (Agamben 2000a, p. 152).   
And this is the truth of origins that Agamben detects at work in Benjamin’s study, for ‘According 
to Benjamin, by contrast—and the radicality of his thought lies here—to redeem the past is not to restore 
its true dignity, to transmit it anew as an inheritance for future generations’ (Agamben 2000a, p. 153).  A 
true redemption of the past can only bring matters to a close, not perpetuate them further, as conceivable 
on something like the Day of Judgment: ‘For Benjamin, what is at issue is an interruption of tradition in 
which the past is fulfilled and thereby brought to its end once and for all.  For humanity as for the 
individual human, to redeem the past is to put an end to it, to cast upon it a gaze that fulfills it’ (Agamben 
2000a, p. 153).  This is a task both to ‘shake off the past and bring it into the hands of humanity’, what 
Agamben unhesitatingly calls an ‘unusual’ task (Agamben 2000a, p. 153).  ‘Unusual’ perhaps because it 
appears to do away with historical narrativizing altogether—perhaps another, more alienating dis-junction 
of the modern subject.  And yet citations are not just messianic fulfillments (in a theological sense) but 
also the unsurprising upending of historical representations themselves, a living-in-the-present which 
cannot be manipulated for canonical-ideological or religious ends.  For Agamben, at least, bringing 
‘dialectics to a standstill’ is the first fundamental act taken toward ending political and cultural 
representations as a whole, the completed task of a profanation of the quasi-sacred museum pieces and the 
start of a community still yet to come (Agamben 1993c).   
 As we have already seen for Benjamin, the real issue at stake within modernity was one 
concerning the ‘transmissibility of culture’ and the increasingly complex impasses which any attempt at 
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transmission would inevitably encounter.  Following Agamben’s formulation of this context, we are able 
to see how  
The particular power of quotations arises, according to Benjamin, not from their ability to 
transmit that past and allow the reader to relive it but, on the contrary, from their capacity to 
“make a clean sweep, to expel from the context, to destroy.”  Alienating by force a fragment of 
the past from its historical context, the quotation at once makes it lose its character of authentic 
testimony and invests it with an alienating power that constitutes its unmistakable aggressive 
force.  (Agamben 1999, p.104) 
   
And this reality of the citation, in some sense at least, is what first confronts the reader of Benjamin’s 
Arcades Project, a project dedicated to (‘aggressively’) re-defining the scope of how the 19th Century is 
historically perceived.  At the same time, however, the stakes within Benjamin’s project were far greater, 
attempting to do nothing less than completely (re)conceive the relationship between history and authority, 
as I have been indicating throughout this essay.  Authority, from his view, is only maintained through 
time by traversing over its own historical context, that is, by being torn as a citation from its context, 
registering itself for an instant in the present (its ‘now-time’ or Jetztzeit of the dialectical image ‘at a 
standstill’) (Benjamin 1999b, p. 473).  A fuller significance of this passage is now made legible to us as 
we stand to contextualize these remarks within the scope of Agamben’s own claims against the linkage of 
citation and authority.  As Agamben puts it quite pointedly, ‘Benjamin, who for his entire life pursued the 
idea of writing a work made up exclusively of quotations, had understood that the authority invoked by 
the quotation is founded precisely on the destruction of the authority that is attributed to a certain text by 
its situation in the history of culture’ (Agamben 1999, p. 104).   
Authority is established, in Benjamin’s eyes, by superseding (destroying) all previous claims to 
authority, and thereby exposing the processes of sovereign power that function within the act of citation.  
What Benjamin does to these processes, however, and through his own use of citations, is not simply a 
perpetuation of this cycle.  He is rather determined to upend its functioning and to provide an alternate 
reading of history—its liberating (messianic) weak force.  For Benjamin then, as Agamben puts it,  
Its truth content is a function of the uniqueness of its appearance, alienated from its living context 
in what Benjamin, in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” defines as “une citation à l’ordre 
du jour’ (“a quotation on the order of the day”) on the day of the Last Judgment.  The past can 
only be fixed in the image that appears once and for all in the instant of its alienation, just as a 
memory appears suddenly, as in a flash, in a moment of danger.  (Agamben 1999, pp. 104-5) 
 
In many ways, the appearance of the past image (Benjamin’s messianic image), torn forever from 
its historically-situated context, was an appearance of authority from outside of whatever ‘authority’ had 
been constituted as sovereign.  This is an appearance of an authority on the level of citations that could 
only be read as a contestation of whatever ‘authority’ posited itself as such in the present.  An almost 
paradoxical definition of authority (‘paradoxical’ because only an authority from outside of what is 
13 
 
presently considered as ‘authoritative’ can be said to arise from history), it provides a unique commentary 
on an earlier aporia of the grounding of authority which Agamben had been attempting to work out in 
relation to citationality.  This aporia becomes manifest precisely in what he calls the ‘vicious circle of 
authority and citation’.  Specifically, it is an aporia wherein ‘authority is the source of the citation but the 
citation is the source of authority’, a state which then ‘renders impossible the birth of real authority in the 
modern world (or, more exactly, only renders possible its “authoritarian” counterfeit) […]’ (Agamben 
1993b, p. 74).  This is consequently to reveal a force of citation which is deliberately, and often, 
employed within the various social, cultural, political and religious domains in order to achieve 
hegemonic ends.3  It is also the staple tactic employed in all academic and educational contexts though 
with assuredly less understanding of the reasons as to why this citational reality is exercised as such. 
 What all of this is leading us toward is the question of whether citations from the past register 
themselves as an authority that is capable of disrupting the present ‘authoritative’ structuring of cultural 
legibility, or whether they in turn legitimate such an order.  Either way, citationality should be conceived 
as being among the ranks of a political decisionism in some sense, deftly choosing from among the ruins 
of history for its own canonical (and so always to some extent ideological, or religious) representations.  
As such, new ‘less violent’ forms of citation might develop in the future, while the ‘more violent’ forms 
are slowly eradicated from general acceptance.4  Yet, things might also not be so simple.  According to 
Agamben’s reading of Benjamin, this often repeated formulation does not fully embrace the radicality of 
Pauline, messianic thinking.  Indeed, the complexity of citationality may in fact come to reflect the 
complex (mis)readings of the coming of an historical messiah, ones we have on record, such as the 
tension evident between the expectations of a political messiah (who would redefine political 
representations, as with the Maccabean revolt, etc) and a messiah who comes to end political 
representation itself (for Agamben, this is Paul’s Christ) (see Agamben 2005a).   
For Agamben, the past image brought into the present in order to ‘complete’ it is not simply a 
‘less violent’ form of representation: it is rather the end of representation itself.  And with the end of 
representation comes the beginning of a new ethical paradigm which Agamben will formulate as being 
beyond any ‘resemblance’ sought within the field of representation.  This is a movement straight toward 
the pure word spoken not as a form of representation, but as a pure presentation, something Agamben 
refers to as an ‘exposure’, the true target of what any citation attempts to embody, but is ultimately 
                                                 
3
 These comments are to be read in conjunction with both Benjamin’s and Agamben’s work on Carl Schmitt and the 
notion of sovereignty implied therein, for it is only the decision of the sovereign as such that can cut through the 
aporia of authority, through its ungroundedness and its inability to justify its own existence (cf Schmitt, p. 5ff; 
Agamben 2005b p. 1ff). 
4
 Just such a proposal seems inherent in the work of Jacques Derrida who took up similar themes to these found here 
in his numerous works.  See the conclusions drawn in Lawlor. 
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incapable of doing.  It is also the reason that Christianity, in his eyes, has elevated the very existence of 
language to the level of a sacrament (see Agamben 2010a). 
 Taking up these remarks on the attempt to present something beyond its representational confines 
alongside his writings elsewhere on the nature of the ‘face’, we are confronted with a unique 
understanding of citations as an attempt made within language to present the pure communicability of the 
human being—our face (Agamben 2000b, p. 97).  There is a ‘visage’ beyond any representation that the 
reality of a particular face presents us with and that exposes us to the other before us, in all its nudity so to 
speak.  Almost as if beyond this, there is also a fundamental linguistic element contained within such an 
exposure of our being—that which unites such an exposure of our visage with the nature of language and 
citations.  As he puts it, ‘The face is not something that transcends the visage: it is the exposition of the 
visage in all its nudity, it is a victory over character – it is word’ (Agamben 2000b, p. 97).  It is a word of 
pure expression seemingly beyond all language and yet which invokes a particular experience of language 
(much as citations often seek to do). 
In other words, the face is language itself, the pure word that humanity has been searching for and 
longing to cite in contestation of an unjust (authoritarian) sovereign rule of representations within the 
present.  This is the radical insight that Agamben seems to be pointing us toward, and that which would 
certainly give us pause to (re)consider how it is that we write and record ourselves in language.  It is 
moreover what we have apparently been searching for within history and what Benjamin’s ‘dialectical 
materialism’ sought to retrieve from the ruins of civilization.  It is the summit of that which all character 
points toward and which must courageously be presented in its ‘nudity’ before another face (cf. the 
emphasis on nudity in Agamben 2010b).  It is what Agamben will refer to as the quasi-mystical, quasi-
sacred ‘exposition’ of the face as it becomes the truth presented beyond representations, beyond the 
limitations constitutive of the human being as a particular, historical construct.  Over and beyond this, its 
exposition is also the pure showing of the face that language is unable to present in linguistic terms.  The 
face can only present this reality by exposing itself, by showing itself as it were.  Ultimately, Agamben’s 
complete revisioning of ethics results, as we shall see, in this attempt to comprehend the face as the 
present-image that is dialectically, materially sought in fulfillment of the past, the face of the other before 
us, and the real quotation which Benjamin longed to cite. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It was Michel de Certeau who once quipped that it was the art of citation which ‘[…] appears to 
be the ultimate weapon for making people believe’ (de Certeau, p. 188).  This was the case for him 
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because citation could be said to play off people’s assumptions concerning belief.  Our ‘reality’ is 
generated by our reliance upon the general sense of belief which circulates around us through the 
(self)citations continuously being performed in society.  Citation, in fact, for de Certeau, provides a 
modern sense of credibility in the face of religious disintegration and thus comes to replace those 
unbelievable doctrines that once were seen to support the religious (or perhaps all representational) life.   
For Agamben, being beyond representation means being beyond citation, and beyond the varied 
notions of sovereignty associated with it, hence beyond the historical forms of religious life tout court.  In 
truth, the face is what citations ultimately strive to become, to embody as it were, like the ‘whatever’ 
nature of the infant’s face, searching for something wholly beyond authority and that usually comes to 
define a relation of love (Agamben 1993c, p. 106ff).  The face is the citation sought among the ruins of 
history that can yet give life to the fractured human self and which can provide the much sought after 
sense of ‘transcendence in immanence’ that religions have subsequently distorted and monopolized.  
Hence the appropriation of citationality by a gender-theorist such as Judith Butler is not as remote from 
this context as it might seem at first glance.  It is this stress upon the body called forward through 
language into history that she is seeking to recover and to love, in all its embodiable forms, a celebration 
of a ‘whatever’ being that demands to be loved  as much as addressed, not subjected to a series of violent 
(normative) representational frameworks which strive for hegemonic bids of sovereign power (Butler 
2004; cf. Agamben 1993c, p. 20ff).   
 Agamben’s development of Benjamin’s theory of citationality yields a hope that human nature 
can get beyond cultural significations in some sense, beyond political representations and enter into an 
unforeseen world, not utopian, but rather the most realistic one could imagine.  In what might be the 
simplest clarification on what paradise could in fact be: ‘[…] here language […] returns to that which 
never was and to that which it never left, and thus it takes the simple form of a habit’ (Agamben 1991, p. 
97).  This would be a bold move toward a new form of writing, one that strives to be a habit more than a 
sovereign claim to power.  Just what such a form of writing might entail, however, remains an open 
question, one very much needing to be further explored. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1.  ‘Since the goal is already present and thus no path exists that could lead there, only the perennially late 
stubbornness of a messenger whose message is nothing other than the task of transmission can give back to man, 
who has lost his ability to appropriate his historical space, the concrete space of his action and knowledge’ 
(Agamben 1999, p. 114).   
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2.  Likewise, this seems to be the source of Agamben’s involvement with German legal theorist Carl Schmitt and his 
Homo Sacer project, for the link between citation and authority is one which reveals the powers at work in our world 
as much as the means toward subverting them (cf. Agamben 1998; Agamben 2005b). 
 
3.  These comments are to be read in conjunction with both Benjamin’s and Agamben’s work on Carl Schmitt and 
the notion of sovereignty implied therein, for it is only the decision of the sovereign as such that can cut through the 
aporia of authority, through its ungroundedness and its inability to justify its own existence (cf Schmitt, p. 5ff; 
Agamben 2005b p. 1ff). 
 
4.  Just such a proposal seems inherent in the work of Jacques Derrida who took up similar themes to these found 
here in his numerous works.  See the conclusions drawn in Lawlor. 
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